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Abstract
McGee (1985) argues that it is sometimes reasonable to accept both x
and x → (y → z) without accepting y → z, and that modus ponens is
therefore invalid for natural language indicative conditionals. Here, we ex-
amine McGee’s counterexamples from a Bayesian perspective. We argue
that the counterexamples are genuine insofar as the joint acceptance of x
and x → (y → z) at time t does not generally imply constraints on the ac-
ceptability of y→ z at t, but we use the distance-based approach to Bayesian
learning to show that applications of modus ponens are nevertheless guar-
anteed to be successful in an important sense. Roughly, if an agent becomes
convinced of the premises of a modus ponens argument, then she should like-
wise become convinced of the argument’s conclusion. Thus we take McGee’s
counterexamples to disentangle and reveal two distinct ways in which argu-
ments can convince. Any general theory of argumentation must take stock
of both.
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1 Introduction
McGee (1985) argues that modus ponens is invalid for natural language indicative
conditionals on the grounds that it is sometimes reasonable to accept x and x →
(y → z) without accepting y → z. Though it is controversial whether McGee
successfully invalidates modus ponens by showing that x and x → (y → z) can
be true while y → z is false,1 McGee does show that one can reasonably accept
x and x → (y → z) while not accepting y → z. Consider McGee’s (1985, p. 463)
example:
(1) If that animal is a fish, then if it has lungs, it’s a lungfish.
(2) That animal is a fish.
(3) If that animal has lungs, then it’s a lungfish.
Just because you think (2) that the animal is a fish and (1) that if it’s a fish, then
if it has lungs, it’s a lungfish, doesn’t mean you should think (3) that if the animal
has lungs, then it’s a lungfish. Indeed, it seems reasonable to conjecture that if it
has lungs, it’s not a fish at all. So it seems reasonable to accept (1) and (2) while
judging (3) to be utterly unacceptable.
The same is not true for standard applications of modus ponens not involving
“right-nested” conditionals, i.e., conditionals whose consequents are themselves
conditionals. Consider:
(4) If that animal is a fish, then it has gills.
(5) That animal is a fish.
(6) That animal has gills.
In the event that you accept (4) and (5), it seems that you should accept (6) –
or at least that your opinion about (6) can’t wildly diverge from your opinion
about (4) and (5) in the way that your opinion about (3) can wildly diverge from
your opinions about (1) and (2). So it seems that there is some intuitive sense
in which the convincingness of modus ponens arguments whose major premises
include right-nested conditionals comes apart from the convincingness of standard
modus ponens arguments.
In this paper, we assess these arguments from a Bayesian perspective and argue
that there is one sense in which modus ponens arguments are bound to convince
no matter whether they involve right-nested conditionals, and another in which
only standard modus ponens arguments are convincing. First, we use synchronic
probability theory to show that arguments involving right-nested conditionals dif-
fer from standard modus ponens arguments insofar as acceptance of their premises
at time t does not generally constrain the set of rational attitudes that can be
1See Bledin (2015), Piller (1996), and Sinnott-Armstrong et al. (1986).
2
adopted towards their conclusions at t, while the same is not true of standard
modus ponens arguments. Then, we use the distance-based approach to Bayesian
learning to show that all modus ponens arguments are unified in the sense that
they are diachronically convincing.2 That is, all modus ponens arguments are con-
vincing (roughly) insofar as it is rational to become convinced of their conclusions
upon becoming convinced of their premises.3
This means that McGee’s “counterexamples” are interesting not only insofar
as they show (or fail to show) that the premises of a modus ponens argument can
be true while the conclusion is false, but also because they drive a wedge between
the distinct ways in which arguments can convince. On the one hand, these argu-
ments (like standard modus ponens arguments) are convincing in the sense that
it is rational to become more convinced of their conclusions when you learn their
premises. On the other hand, unlike standard modus ponens arguments, these ar-
guments are not convincing in the sense that your standing attitudes towards their
premises constrain what you should think (now) about their conclusions. Thus we
can draw a lesson from McGee’s “counterexamples” that has not yet been drawn in
the literature: there are at least two distinct ways in which arguments can qualify
as convincing, and any general theory of argumentation should take stock of both.
2 The Synchronic Bayesian Perspective
If two people are arguing, If p, will q? and both are in doubt as to
p, they are adding p hypothetically to their stock of knowledge, and
arguing on that basis about q ; they are fixing their degrees of belief in
q given p. (Ramsey, 1929)
Ramsey’s words have inspired a great philosophical tradition of treating the
acceptability of a natural language indicative conditional as the probability of its
consequent given its antecedent. This is most conspicuously stated by Adams
(1975), who says that the following equation holds for all simple conditionals,
x→ y, such that P (x) > 0:4
Adams’ Acceptability Thesis (AAT): Acc(x→ y) = P (y|x).
AAT has struck many philosophers as intuitive and has been shown time and
2We introduce the distance-based approach to Bayesian learning in Section 3.
3We state the sense in which all modus ponens arguments are convincing more precisely in
Section 3.
4Adams initially expressed his thesis in terms of probability rather than acceptability. But
because he explicitly warned against interpreting the probability of the conditional as the prob-
ability of its truth, and instead interpreted the probability of the conditional as the assertability
or acceptability of the conditional (a` la Ramsey), AAT can be stated as we state it here.
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time again to capture actual human reasoning about conditionals.5 Various triv-
iality results (e.g., Lewis 1976 and Ha´jek 1989) yield some reason to doubt that
AAT can be maintained when x → y is regarded as a proposition, but there are
some (e.g., Bennett 2003 and Edgington 1995) who are happy to maintain that
indicative conditionals are not propositions, and still others (e.g., Douven 2016)
who argue that indicative conditionals can be propositional even given AAT and
the triviality results.
Anyway, our concern here is not with whether conditionals qualify as propo-
sitions, but is rather with how the acceptance of conditionals can be plausibly
modeled (since we are ultimately concerned with the implications of accepting
conditionals in the context of modus ponens arguments). In this setting, it seems
reasonable to assume AAT simply because, as has been empirically demonstrated,
most of us adopt a tendency to assign degrees of belief to y under the supposition
that x to the extent that we accept x→ y.6 This means that we can represent the
attitudes that one has towards the premises and conclusion of a standard modus
ponens arguments in the following terms:
(a) P (y|x);
(b) P (x);
(c) P (y).
This doesn’t quite get us what we need in order to assess modus ponens arguments
involving right-nested conditionals. The reason is that the applicability of AAT is
limited to simple conditionals, and right-nested conditionals are not simple con-
ditionals. Consider x → (y → z). If we were to apply AAT to this conditional, it
would seem that Acc(x→ (y → z)) = P ((z|y)|x), but there is no such probability
expression as P ((z|y)|x).
In order to apply AAT to right-nested conditionals, we require some way of
understanding x → (y → z) in terms that can readily be expressed by the proba-
bility calculus. Luckily, there is one. In his original (1985) paper, McGee argues
5In recent years, it has been shown that there may be some contexts in which AAT does
not capture human reasoning about conditionals. For example, Douven and Verbrugge (2013)
show that AAT may get things wrong when x and y are completely independent and unrelated.
Nevertheless, there is a wide body of literature (referenced in Douven and Verbrugge 2013)
showing that AAT gets things right in many contexts, and there is no reason to believe that any
of the contexts that we consider here are exceptions to this rule (since, e.g., we deal only with
conditionals whose antecedents are relevant to their consequents).
6To some, it may sound as though we are committing the is-ought fallacy because we use
empirical results to draw conclusions about the normative concept of ‘acceptability’. Though we
cannot settle this thorny issue here, we believe that we are justified in using empirical results to
draw conclusions about the conditions under which sentences are acceptable because the relevant
norms derive from linguistic convention, and this is precisely what is being empirically probed.
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that we are equally willing to accept x→ (y→ z) and (x∧ y)→ z.7 For example,
it seems that we are just as willing to accept“if that animal is a fish, then if it has
lungs, it’s a lungfish” as we are willing to accept “if that animal is a fish and has
lungs, then it’s a lungfish.” Following McGee, then, we can posit “Acceptability
Import-Export” (AIE):
AIE: Acc(x→ (y → z)) = Acc((x ∧ y)→ z).
Together with AAT, AIE implies that Acc(x→ (y → z)) = P (z|x ∧ y).8 This
is a nice result for anyone interested in analyzing the acceptability of indicative
conditionals in terms of conditional probabilities (since it extends the analysis
to right-nested conditionals), but one can reasonably wonder whether AIE accu-
rately captures actual reasoning about nested conditionals. As things turn out,
van Wijnbergen-Huitink et al. (2015) find no significant difference between the
extent to which humans believe (or accept) the right-nested conditional and the
extent to which humans believe (or accept) its imported form. So it seems that
AIE benefits from empirical confirmation, and that it is therefore plausible to
understand Acc(x→ (y → z)) in terms of P (z|x ∧ y).9 This means that we can
represent the attitudes that one has towards the premises and conclusion of an
instance of modus ponens involving a right-nested conditional as follows:
(d) P (z|x ∧ y);
(e) P (x);
(f) P (z|y).
From the synchronic Bayesian perspective, the constraints implied on (c) by (a)
and (b) are very different from the constraints implied on (f) by (d) and (e). In
fact, while the values of (a) and (b) fix a lower bounds for (c), almost no constraint
is implied by the values of (d) and (e) on (f).10
7This is closely related to the principle, import-export, according to which x → (y → z)
and (x ∧ y) → z are logically equivalent. McGee proves that any connective, →, that satisfies
some basic constraints and validates both import-export and modus ponens must be logically
equivalent to the material conditional. Thus McGee shows that we must either (i) analyze the
natural language conditional as the material conditional, (ii) deny the validity of modus ponens,
(iii) deny the validity of import-export, or (iv) analyze the conditional such that it fails to satisfy
McGee’s basic constraints. See McGee (1985, pp. 465-466) for the details.
8As an anonymous referee helpfully points out, this follows only when AIE is restricted to
settings where P (x ∧ y) > 0 (since AAT applies only in these settings).
9Here again, one might worry that we are guilty of committing the is-ought fallacy. Our
response is the same as earlier. Because norms of acceptability derive from linguistic convention,
norms of acceptability can be confirmed by empirical results about linguistic convention.
10The reason for the inclusion of ‘almost’ is that (d) and (e) do imply constraints on (f) in the
special case where P (x) = 1 (since P (z|x ∧ y) reduces to P (z|y) when P (x) = 1). But in the
great many contexts where (d) and (e) are non-extreme, they imply no lower bounds for (f).
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This is easy to see when we use probability theory to expand (c) and (f). If we
apply the law of total probability to (c), we discover that:
P (y) = P (y|x)P (x) + P (y|¬x)P (¬x).
Since the first two probabilities correspond to (a) and (b), it is clear that the
acceptability of (c) must be at least as great as the product of the acceptabilities
of (a) and (b).11 This means that if we accept (a) and (b) to a high degree, then
we must likewise accept (c) to a reasonably high degree. Of course we might
coherently take (c) to be slightly less acceptable than either (a) or (b) (since the
product of (a) and (b) is less than (a) and less than (b) when neither (a) nor (b)
equals 1), but (c) cannot dip too far below the acceptability of the premises when
both (a) and (b) are reasonably high since, for example, (c) must be at least .81
when (a) is at least .9 and (b) is at least .9.
We cannot straightforwardly apply the law of total probability to (f) because it
expresses a conditional probability, but with a little bit of algebraic manipulation,
we arrive at the following expansion of (f):
P (z|y) = P (z|x ∧ y)P (x|y) + P (z|¬x ∧ y)P (¬x|y).
Though the first probability in the expansion corresponds to (d), none of the other
probabilities appear in the premises. This means that you can coherently assign
(f) a probability as low as 0 (or as high as 1) even when you regard (d) and (e) as
highly acceptable.12 For example, if you assign .99 to (d) and .99 to (e), you can
coherently judge (f) to be utterly unacceptable because you can coherently assign
the last three probabilities of the expansion extremely low values, and thereby
derive an extremely low probability for (f).
From the synchronic Bayesian perspective, then, it makes perfect sense to find it
utterly unacceptable that (3) if the animal has lungs, then it’s a lungfish, even when
you find it highly acceptable that (1) if it’s a fish, then if it has lungs, it’s a lungfish,
and that (2) it’s a fish. The same pattern does not hold for standard applications
of modus ponens. If you find it highly acceptable that (4) if it is a fish, then it
has gills, and that (5) the animal is a fish, then – on pain of incoherence – you
must find it reasonably acceptable that (6) it has gills. The synchronic Bayesian
perspective thus appears to vindicate the initial thought that the convincingness of
modus ponens arguments whose major premises include right-nested conditionals
comes apart from the convincingness of standard modus ponens arguments.
11This is because the product of the second two probabilities cannot be negative.
12Again, if you regard (e) as fully acceptable – i.e., if Acc(x) = 1 – then you must regard (f)
and (e) as equally acceptable. But if you have any doubts at all about (d) and (e), then your
opinions about (d) and (e) do not imply constraints on your opinion of (f). This underscores
an important point. If you fully accept the minor premise of McGee’s example, then you must
regard its major premise and conclusion as equally acceptable. This means that in the special
case where the agent fully accepts the minor premise of McGee’s putative counterexample, modus
ponens actually does qualify as synchronically convincing in an important sense.
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3 The Diachronic Bayesian Perspective
At this juncture, it may seem as though modus ponens arguments involving right-
nested conditionals are unsuccessful when viewed from the Bayesian lens. If you
accept their premises, you can think whatever you want about their conclusions.
So they are not convincing arguments.
But this is not the whole Bayesian story. Though it is true that your stand-
ing joint acceptance of x and x → (y → z) at time t does not imply that you
should at all accept y→ z at t, there may be some other Bayesian sense in which
these arguments qualify as convincing.13 In a recent paper, Eva and Hartmann
(forthcoming) consider whether and when various argument forms are convincing
inasmuch as it is rational to become convinced of their conclusions upon learning
their premises. That is, rather than asking whether an agent’s current attitudes
towards the premises of an argument commit her to having certain attitudes to-
wards its conclusion, they ask how and whether an agent’s attitudes towards an
argument’s conclusion should change upon becoming convinced of its premises.
In order to probe questions of this sort, Eva and Hartmann (‘EH’) deploy the
distance-based approach to Bayesian learning, according to which we can deter-
mine how an agent should update her credal state after learning some new infor-
mation by using a distance or divergence measure to determine which of the many
probability functions compatible with what she learned is closest to her initial
(prior) probability function. Thus when the agent learns to fully accept both that
the animal has gills if it is a fish and that the animal is a fish, we determine what
the closest probability function Q is to her prior probability function P that obeys
the constraints that Q(gills|fish) = 1 and that Q(fish) = 1. The agent should then
adopt this probability function because doing so yields the maximally conservative
update – or, put differently, because adopting this probability function embodies
the minimal revision that manages to incorporate everything learned by the agent
across the update.
Which probability function counts as closest to the prior depends on what
distance or divergence metric is used to calculate closeness. Eva and Hartmann
focus primarily on the minimization of Kullback-Leibler divergence (‘KL’). The KL
divergence is defined as follows. Let S1, . . . , Sn be the possible values of a random
variable S over which the probability distributions P and Q are defined. Then
DKL(Q||P ) :=
n∑
i=1
qi · log (qi/pi) ,
where we have used the abbreviations pi := P (Si) and qi := Q(Si).
14
13An agent plausibly accepts a conditional when she judges its acceptability to be above a
reasonable (perhaps contextually determined) threshold.
14Note that the KL divergence is not symmetrical and that it may not satisfy the triangle
inequality. This means that it is not a distance measure in the mathematical sense of the term.
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Like EH, we focus on minimizing KL because it yields Bayesian conditionaliza-
tion when the agent learns something with certainty, and Jeffrey conditionalization
when the agent acquires a new non-extreme probability estimate for something.15
Where KL minimization earns its keep over these more standard updating proce-
dures is when the agent learns something that cannot be straightforwardly repre-
sented in terms of conditionalization (or Jeffrey conditionalization) – e.g., when
the agent learns a new conditional probability estimate, or when the agent learns
to treat some propositions as probabilistically (in)dependent. This is of utmost
importance when determining whether an agent should accept the conclusion of
an argument upon learning its premises for the simple reason that the premises
of arguments often contain conditionals, and it is plausible to represent learning
x → y in terms of an increase in the agent’s subjective conditional probability of
y given x.
EH use the distance-based approach to Bayesian learning to prove results about
the value of deductively valid arguments from the diachronic Bayesian perspective.
For example, under the assumption of AAT, EH show that deductively valid argu-
ment forms like modus ponens and modus tollens differ from so-called “fallacious”
argument forms like affirming the consequent and denying the antecedent insofar
as agents who learn the deductively valid arguments’ premises should, as a matter
of necessity, become more convinced of their conclusions, while agents who learn
the other arguments’ premises need not become more convinced of their conclu-
sions.16,17
Of special interest here are EH’s two results about modus ponens. First, EH
prove that if an agent becomes fully convinced of x → y and becomes more con-
vinced of x, then, when the agent minimizes KL, she necessarily becomes more
confident in y. Second, EH prove that if an agent becomes more convinced of
x→ y and does not alter her degree of belief in y across some update, then, when
the agent minimizes KL, she necessarily becomes more confident in y.18 The case
15KL is actually a member of a broader family of f -divergences that all yield Bayesian condi-
tionalization and Jeffrey conditionalization. EH do not offer any principled reason to prefer KL
to other f -divergences, but work with KL because it is well-known and used by other Bayesians.
Like EH, we are open to deploying other f -divergences, but work primarily with KL for similar
reasons. It is worth mentioning, though, that KL is the only f -divergence that is a Bregmann
divergence, and that it can therefore be argued for on the grounds that it is the only f -divergence
that defines updates that minimize expected inaccuracy when measured by strictly proper scor-
ing rules. (See Amari (2009) and Pettigrew (2016) for background.) At any rate, as we report
our own results, we keep tabs (in the footnotes) of which results hold for KL and which results
hold for the entire class of f -divergences.
16Hahn and Oaksford (2006) use Bayesian tools to argue that these “fallacious” argument
forms are actually legitimate modes of argumentation in many contexts.
17Eva and Hartmann show this by assessing whether the probability of the conclusion must
increase when the agent minimizes KL – no matter her prior – while satisfying certain constraints
corresponding to what she learns about the premises. The precise content of these constraints
varies with the particular result. In the next paragraph, we outline the precise constraints where
the EH results apply in the case of standard instances of modus ponens.
18More formally, if P is the prior and Q is the posterior, EH prove, first, that Q(y) > P (y) if
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where an agent becomes fully convinced of both premises is the special case of the
first result where the increase in probability of the minor premise goes all the way
to certainty.19
If the EH results extended to applications of modus ponens involving right-
nested conditionals, then there would already be proof that the McGee cases ex-
emplify an argument form where modus ponens is convincing diachronically (in the
sense specified by the EH results), but not synchronically (because of the findings
from the last section). But the EH results are limited to contexts where x and y
are Boolean combinations of atomic propositions, and it is therefore still unclear
how applications of modus ponens involving right-nested conditionals fare when
assessed from the diachronic Bayesian perspective.20
In order to probe this question, we can model the acceptability of these premises
in terms of (d) and (e), and the acceptability of the conclusion in terms of (f). Then
we can gauge what happens when we minimize KL while satisfying constraints like
those deployed in the EH results about standard applications of modus ponens.
We assume that the agent has a prior probability distribution P over the binary
propositional variables X, Y, Z (with the values x and ¬x etc.). She then learns the
premises of the argument. They result in constraints on the posterior probability
distribution Q. Let us now consider the scenarios that EH consider in the context
of standard applications of modus ponens.
In the first scenario, we consider the situation where the acceptability of the
major premise, x→ (y→ z), goes to 1 and the acceptability of the minor premise,
x, increases. Then we ask whether the acceptability of the conclusion, y→ z, must
increase. Given AAT and AIE, this leads to the following two constraints on the
posterior:
Premise MP1: Q(z|x ∧ y) = 1.
Premise MP2: Q(x) > P (x).
We can then prove the following theorem (all proofs are in the appendix):
Q(y|x) = 1 and Q(x) > P (x), and, second, that Q(y) > P (y) if Q(y|x) > P (y|x) and Q(x) = P (x).
19It is perhaps natural to wonder whether the acceptability of the conclusion goes up whenever
one comes to accept both premises more than she used to. As EH (forthcoming) note, this result
interestingly does not hold – basically because the acceptability of the conclusion can decrease
when the acceptability of both premises increase, provided that the minor premise and the
conclusion are heavily anti-correlated in the prior.
20Throughout this paper, it should be clear that we are assuming (with Eva and Hartmann)
that the indicative conditional is not the material conditional. Were the indicative conditional the
material conditional, then AAT would not be plausible. It is reasonable to wonder whether our
treatment of indicative conditionals requires that we assume anything else about the semantics of
the indicative conditional. For all we know, the answer may be yes, but we would like to leave this
issue for later. It is notoriously difficult to develop a semantics for indicative conditionals that
vindicates AAT and AIE while treating indicative conditionals as propositions, and we remain
open to the possibility that indicative conditionals are not propositions. But we also remain
open to the possibility that indicative conditionals are, in fact, propositions, and that AAT and
AIE can be vindicated by pragmatics.
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Theorem 1 An agent considers the propositional variables X, Y, and Z and has
a prior probability distribution P defined over them. If the agent minimizes any
f -divergence (including KL) between the posterior probability distribution Q and P
while satisfying the constraints in MP1 and MP2, then the acceptability of y→ z
increases, i.e., Q(z|y) > P (z|y).
In the second scenario, we consider the situation where the acceptability of the
major premise, x → (y → z), increases to some value smaller than 1, and the
probability of the minor premise, x, does not change. This leads to the following
two constraints on the posterior:
Premise MP1’: Q(z|x ∧ y) > P (z|x, y).
Premise MP2’: Q(x) = P (x).
We can then prove the following theorem:
Theorem 2 An agent considers the propositional variables X, Y, and Z, and has
a prior probability distribution P defined over them. If the agent minimizes KL be-
tween the posterior probability distribution Q and P while satisfying the constraints
in MP1′ and MP2′ then the acceptability of y→ z increases, i.e., Q(z|y) > P (z|y).
These two theorems show that applications of modus ponens involving right-nested
conditionals are diachronically convincing in the very same way that standard ap-
plications of modus ponens are, even though applications of modus ponens involv-
ing right-nested conditionals are different from standard applications inasmuch as
they are not at all synchronically convincing. That is, even though it is true that
your standing joint acceptance of x and x → (y → z) at t does not generally
constrain your opinion of y→ z at t, you should become more convinced of y→ z
upon either (i) becoming fully convinced of x→ (y→ z) and becoming more con-
vinced of x, or (ii) becoming more convinced of x → (y → z) while maintaining
your previous opinion of x.21
4 Revisiting McGee’s Example
In light of these results, it is worth considering McGee’s lungfish example once
more. Though we have already argued that the synchronic Bayesian perspective
vindicates McGee’s insight that it is reasonable to accept the premises while re-
garding the conclusion as utterly unacceptable, it now seems that there is another
sense in which we should find the lungfish example convincing. Namely, you should
become more convinced that if the animal has lungs, then it is a lungfish upon
21Throughout this paper, we say that the agent becomes more convinced of a conditional when
she comes to judge it as more acceptable than she used to, and say that the agent becomes fully
convinced of the conditional when she comes to judge it as fully acceptable (or, equivalently,
comes to assign it an acceptability of 1).
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either (i) becoming fully convinced that if it’s a fish, then if it has lungs, it’s a
lungfish, and becoming more convinced that it’s a fish, or (ii) becoming more con-
vinced that if it’s a fish, then if it has lungs, it’s a lungfish while remaining equally
convinced that it’s a fish. Are these results intuitive?
To gauge the intuitiveness of the first result, consider the following story.
Suppose that Matthias goes to the beach with his marine biologist friend,
Klara, and that Matthias and Klara are wondering what some animal in the water
is. Klara tells Matthias (who knows almost nothing about fish), first, that if that
animal is a fish, then if it has lungs, it’s a lungfish, and, second, that it’s very
probably a fish. Because Matthias trusts Klara, he becomes more confident that
it’s a fish and learns to fully accept that if it is a fish, then if it has lungs, it’s a
lungfish. Should Matthias become more inclined to accept that it’s a lungfish if it
has lungs than he used to be?
Intuitively, yes! Because Matthias is now more confident that it’s a fish and
fully convinced of Klara’s claim about fish with lungs, it seems that Matthias
should be more inclined to accept that it’s a lungfish if it has lungs. After all,
when Matthias learns that it’s very probably a fish, he seems to acquire reason
to think that it’s a lungfish if it has lungs, even if he still has reason to regard
it as unacceptable (overall) that it’s a lungfish if it has lungs. So it seems that
the lungfish argument is intuitively convincing in the sense that Matthias should
regard its conclusion as more acceptable than he used to, even if Matthias need
not regard its conclusion as highly or reasonably acceptable.
Now consider a second story in order to gauge the intuitiveness of the second
result.
Suppose that Klara’s marine biologist friend, Jacques, joins Matthias and Klara
at the beach, and that Klara and Jacques begin to discuss what kind of animal
it might be. Klara reminds Jacques that if it’s a fish, then if it has lungs, it’s a
lungfish, but Jacques is not entirely convinced – viz., Jacques is more inclined to
accept Klara’s claim than he was prior to Klara’s reminder (because he needed the
reminder), but is not totally willing to accept Klara’s claim (perhaps because he
thinks she may be forgetting about some species of fish with lungs). Since Jacques
is a marine biologist himself, he trusts his own estimate that the animal is a fish
and doesn’t budge upon hearing anything from Matthias or Klara. Should Jacques
become more inclined to accept that if the animal has lungs, then it’s a lungfish?
Again, the answer seems to be yes. Because Jacques is now more willing to
accept Klara’s claim about lungfish and just as confident as before that it’s a fish,
it seems that Jacques should be more confident that it’s a lungfish in the event
that it has lungs. And since this confidence corresponds to the acceptability of
the claim that it’s a lungfish if it has lungs, it seems that Jacques should, in fact,
be more willing to accept that the animal is a lungfish if it has lungs after talking
things over with Klara, even if he needn’t think that it is (overall) acceptable.
So here, too, it seems that the lungfish argument is convincing in the sense that
Jacques should regard its conclusion as more acceptable than he used to, even if
he need not regard its conclusion as highly or reasonably acceptable.
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5 Conclusion
Though only standard applications of modus ponens prove to be synchronically
convincing (in the sense outlined in Section 2), every application of modus ponens
appears to be diachronically convincing (in the sense probed by EH). It should
not be surprising that there is some unifying inferential property of modus ponens
arguments, given their common linguistic structure. But McGee’s cases are largely
valuable because they drive a wedge between two ways that arguments can con-
vince. That is, though diachronic convincingness and synchronic convincingness
are a package deal in standard cases of modus ponens, they are decoupled in cases
involving right-nested conditionals, and therefore revealed to be distinct. So it
seems that by reflecting on McGee’s cases, two distinct senses in which arguments
can be convincing are revealed, and that any general theory of argumentation must
take stock of both.
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A Proofs
We represent the probability distributions P and Q in Table 1 with “1” represent-
ing x and “0” representing ¬x etc.
Table 1: The probability distributions P and Q
X Y Z P Q
1 1 1 p1 q1
1 1 0 p2 q2
1 0 1 p3 q3
1 0 0 p4 q4
0 1 1 p5 q5
0 1 0 p6 q6
0 0 1 p7 q7
0 0 0 p8 q8
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A.1 Theorem 1
We consider the situation where the probability of the conditional goes to 1 and the
probability of the minor premise increases. This leads to the following constraints:
1. Q(z|x∧y) = 1. Hence Q(x∧y∧z) = Q(x∧y). Hence Q(x∧y∧¬z) = q2 = 0.
2. Q(x) > P (x).
The second constraint amounts to
q1 + q3 + q4 − p1 − p2 − p3 − p4 − δ = 0 , (1)
with δ > 0. Note that this constraint implies that
a := p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 < 1. (2)
As a further constraint, we make sure that
q1 + q3 + · · ·+ q8 − 1 = 0. (3)
Hence we have to minimize
L =
∑
i 6=2
pi f(qi/pi) + λ (q1 + q3 + q4 − a− δ) + µ (q1 + q3 + · · ·+ q8 − 1),
where f is some convex function with f(1) = 0 (“f -divergence”). To do so, we
compute the following derivatives:
∂L
∂ql
= f ′(ql/pl) + λ+ µ = 0, for l = 1, 3, 4
∂L
∂qm
= f ′(qm/pm) + µ = 0, form = 5, 6, 7, 8
Setting them equal to zero yields
ql = α pl , qm = β pm, (4)
with two parameters α and β which have to be fixed to make sure that the con-
straints (1) and (3) are satisfied. To determine them, we insert the first equation
in eqs. (4) into eq. (1) and obtain
α (p1 + p3 + p4) = a+ δ. (5)
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Hence
α = 1 +
p2 + δ
p1 + p3 + p4
. (6)
(Note that p1 > 0 to make sure that the first constraint can be satisfied.) Next,
we insert eqs. (4) into eq. (3) and obtain:
α (p1 + p3 + p4) + β (p5 + p6 + p7 + p8) = 1 (7)
Using eq. (5), we obtain
a+ δ + β (p5 + p6 + p7 + p8) = 1. (8)
Using the fact that p1 + p2 + · · ·+ p8 = 1 and setting a := 1− a, we obtain
a+ δ + β a = 1. (9)
Hence,
β = 1− δ
a
. (10)
We also express α in terms of the variable a:
α = 1 +
p2 + δ
a− p2 (11)
Next, we calculate
P (z|y) = P (y ∧ z)
P (y)
=
p1 + p5
p1 + p2 + p5 + p6
Q(z|y) = Q(y ∧ z)
P (y)
=
q1 + q5
q1 + q5 + q6
=
α p1 + β p5
α p1 + β (p5 + p6)
.
Hence,
∆ = Q(z|y)− P (z|y) = ∆
′
(p1 + p2 + p5 + p6) (α p1 + β (p5 + p6))
,
with
∆′ = (α p1 + β p5)(p1 + p2 + p5 + p6)− (p1 + p5)(α p1 + β (p5 + p6))
= (α− β) p1 p6 + α p1 p2 + β p2 p5.
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Finally, we note that α, β > 0 and that
α− β = p2 + δ
a− p2 +
δ
a
=
p2 · a+ p2 · δ
(a− p2) a . (12)
From eq. (12) it is easy to see that α − β > 0 if δ > 0. Hence, ∆ > 0 if δ > 0,
which is what we wanted to show.
A.2 Theorem 2
We consider the situation where the probability of the conditional increases and
the probability of the minor premise does not change. That is, we request that
1. Q(z|x ∧ y) > P (z|x ∧ y). This amounts to:
α p2 q1 − (p1 + α p2) q2 = 0, (13)
with 0 < α ≤ 1. This can be seen as follows. Let Q(z|x∧y) = P (z|x∧y)+δ ≤
1 with δ > 0. This implies that δ ≤ 1−P (z|x∧y) = P (¬z|x∧y). We therefore
set
δ = α · P (¬z|x ∧ y) = α p2
p1 + p2
with 0 < α ≤ 1. The parameter α regulates how much the conditional
probability increases. α = 0 means no increase at all, α = 1 is the maximal
increase. In this case the new probability Q(z|x ∧ y) equals 1. Hence,
Q(z|x ∧ y) = q1
q1 + q2
= P (z|x ∧ y) + α p2
p1 + p2
=
p1 + α p2
p1 + p2
.
After some algebra, we obtain the constraint (13). Note also that the first
condition requires that
0 < p1, p2 < 1. (14)
2. Q(x) = P (x). Hence (using eq. (2)),
q1 + q2 + q3 + q4 − a = 0. (15)
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3. All qi sum up to 1. Hence,
q1 + · · ·+ q8 − 1 = 0. (16)
Adding these constraints via Lagrange multipliers to the KL-divergence, we
arrive at the following function which we have to minimize:
KL =
8∑
i=1
qi log
qi
pi
+ λ (α p2 q1 − (p1 + α p2) q2)
+ µ (q1 + · · ·+ q4 − a) + ν (q1 + · · ·+ q8 − 1) (17)
To find the minimum, we differentiate:
∂KL
∂q1
= 1 + log
q1
p1
+ λα p2 + µ+ ν
∂KL
∂q2
= 1 + log
q2
p2
− λ (p1 + α p2) + µ+ ν
∂KL
∂q3
= 1 + log
q3
p3
+ µ+ ν
∂KL
∂q4
= 1 + log
q4
p4
+ µ+ ν
∂KL
∂qm
= 1 + log
qm
pm
+ ν, m = 5, 6, 7, 8
Setting these expressions equal to zero, we obtain:
q1 = u v e
−λαp2 p1 , q2 = u v eλ (p1+αp2) p2 (18)
q3 = u v p3 , q4 = u v p4 (19)
qm = u pm (20)
with u := e−1−ν and v := e−µ.
Using eqs. (15), (16) and (20) and the fact that the pi sum up to 1, we obtain:
a+ a u = 1. Hence,
u = 1. (21)
Inserting eqs. (18) into eq. (13) yields:
eλ =
(
α p1
p1 + α p2
) 1
p1+p2
(22)
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Inserting eqs. (18) and (19) into eq. (15) then yields:
v =
a
e−λαp2 p1 + eλ (p1+αp2) p2 + p3 + p4
(23)
With eqs. (21), (22), (23), the qi are fully determined.
Let us now explore whether Q(z|y) > P (z|y), i.e. whether
q1 + q5
q1 + q2 + q5 + q6
>
p1 + p5
p1 + p2 + p5 + p6
. (24)
This condition is equivalent to
χ :=
p2 + p6
p1 + p5
· q1 + q5
q2 + q6
> 1. (25)
Inserting the expressions for q1, q2, q5 and q6 yields
χ :=
p2 + p6
p1 + p5
· a p1 + p1 p5 + f(α) p2 p5 + g(α) (p3 + p4) p5
p1 p6 + f(α) p2 (a+ p6) + g(α) (p3 + p4) p6
(26)
with
f(α) :=
α p1
p1 + α p2
(27)
g(α) := f(α)
αp2
p1+p2 . (28)
These functions have the following properties for 0 < α ≤ 1:
0 ≤ f(α), g(α) < 1 (29)
f(α) ≤ g(α) (30)
Property (30) follows because
α p2
p1 + p2
≤ 1.
Note further that χ > 1 if the difference ∆ between the numerator and the
denominator in eq. (26) is greater than zero. We calculate:
∆ = (1− f(α)) ·∆f + (1− g(α)) ·∆g + (g(α)− f(α)) ·∆fg (31)
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with
∆f : = p2 (a p1 + p1 p6 + p1 p5)
∆g : = p1 p6 (p3 + p4)
∆fg : = p2 p5 (p3 + p4).
As ∆f > 0 (see eq. (14)) and ∆g,∆fg ≥ 0, we conclude (using properties (29) and
(30)) that ∆ > 0 (and hence χ > 1).
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